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Many couples do not sign prenuptial agreements, even though this often
leads to costly and ineﬃcient litigation in case of divorce. In this paper
we show that strategic reasons may prevent agents from signing prenuptial
agreements. Partners who value more the beneﬁt of the marriage wish to
signal their type by running the risk of a costly divorce. Hence this contract
incompleteness arises as a screening device. Moreover, the threat of costly
divorce is credible since the lack of an ex-ante agreement leads to a moral
hazard problem within the couple, which induces partners to reject any ex-
post amicable agreement.
Keywords: asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, prenuptial agree-
ment.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D82, K12, D10.1 Introduction
Prenuptial agreements usually include clauses on how partners should behave
d u r i n gm a r r i a g ea n do nh o wt h e ys h o u l dd i v i d et h ec o m m o na s s e t si nc a s e
of divorce. Even though it is quite clear that prenuptial agreements allow
savings in litigation costs, they are uncommon. Legal commentators and
practitioners estimate that only 5-10% of the (USA) population enters into
prenuptial agreements, and one study suggests that only 1.5% of marriage
licence applicants would consider entering into such agreement” (H. Mahar,
2003). The usual justiﬁcations for this phenomenon are the lack of enforce-
ability of premarital contracts, the presence of transaction costs and, ﬁnally,
agents’ excessively optimistic expectations on their marriage.
After a closer scrutiny, all these explanations are not completely satisfac-
tory. For instance, many States in USA have nowadays adopted the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA).1 T h i sA c tp r o v i d e st h a tc o u r t sm u s te n -
force premarital agreements, whenever they satisfy some simple formalities.2
Similar reforms have been adopted in other countries, e.g., Australia. There-
fore it is diﬃcult to assume that in these countries (or states) prenuptial
agreements are diﬃcult to enforce.
As far as it regards the cost of writing prenuptial agreements, it might be
very high if the involved agents have complex activities, but for more com-
mon people many Internet sites oﬀer kits which help to stipulate premarital
agreements at a very low cost, without the help of any legal advisors. The
costs of contracting might also be a consequence of forecasting problems.
Also this explanation is not satisfactory, since many marriages end within
the early years of the union (one ﬁfth of ﬁrst marriages ends within 5 years,
and one third ends within 10, see Bramlett and Moshler (2001)). Therefore
the rate of divorce is high in the ﬁrst years of marriage, making less diﬃcult
to write ex-ante a satisfactory agreement on how to divorce.
Nevertheless, couples could have too optimistic estimates of the proba-
bility of divorce. For instance they could have a wrong perception of the
overall divorce rate. However, from Baker and Emery (1993) it appears that
people correctly estimates the divorce rates, but that most people assume
a much lower probability that they will personally divorce than the overall
1Drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners On Uniform State Law in 1983.
This Act is now adopted in some form in many States.
2“A premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties. It is en-
forceable without consideration.” (UPAA, Section 2 ). Section 6 establishes substantive
requirements for enforceability. Basically the agreements should be executed voluntary
and each party must have (before execution) an adequate knowledge of the property or
ﬁnancial obligations of the other party.
1rate. Thus, there is some evidence of excessively optimistic expectations,
but wrong expectations can never explain why most people do not even sign
postnuptial agreements when marriage comes into a crisis, or why a signif-
icant number of couples choose an adversarial divorce and not an amicable
one.
If none of the previous explanations seems convincing, we still have to
ﬁnd one. The already quoted contribution by H. Mahar (2003) suggests an
interesting one. In the interviews there reported, 60% of the respondents
considers receiving a proposal of a prenuptial agreement a bad signal. The
signaling content of the contract will be our starting point. Partners who do
not write a prenuptial agreement, expose themselves to the risk of a costly
litigation in case of divorce. In this way they credibly signal to highly evaluate
marriage and that they want to devote time, eﬀort and endowments to the
success of the relationship. Partners who draw up a prenuptial agreement,
by lowering the cost of divorce, signals a low evaluation of marriage and
therefore that they have less incentive to exert eﬀort in order to make the
relationship successful.
Partners who do not sign a prenuptial agreement, sign a literally incom-
plete contract which in case of divorce, will be completed by means of a
litigation in front of a court. Courts verify partners’ behaviors during the
relationship and divide the assets according to the marital law. Courts’ activ-
ity, then, makes the divorce (even more) costly for the partners. The absence
of a prenuptial contract is a credible signal only if partners cannot complete
their marital contract by themselves when they decide to divorce. In our
model couples who did not sign a premarital agreement do not sign post-
nuptial agreements. Intuitively, mutual distrust prevents real world couples
when they start ﬁghting. In order to model this “mutual distrust” spouses
can take diﬀerent actions during marriage. Therefore there is scope for a
moral hazard problem which is worsened by the absence of prenuptial agree-
ments, since it leaves undeﬁned what has to be considered an appropriate
behavior during marriage. In this setup the lack of a prenuptial agreement
is renegotiation proof, since the proposal of a post-nuptial one is taken as a
signal of unmonitored misbehavior of the proposer.
In summary, the absence of some clauses in a contract is a literal in-
completeness, which is a sort of precommitment (credible or not) to let a
third party complete the contract, verifying the relevant contingencies. The
cost of veriﬁcation is used as a signaling device. If the parties can perfectly
anticipate what the third party will observe (verify) the commitment is not
credible and the parties will renegotiate the previous agreements complet-
ing the contract. However, if the parties cannot predict the outcome of the
veriﬁcation activity, then the precommitment might become credible.
2There are two streams of literature related to our contribution. The ﬁrst,
which stems from the Becker’s seminal works on marriages (Becker 1973,
1974), studies the eﬀect of diﬀerent marriage laws on the marital institution:
Friedberg (1998), Fella, Manzini and Mariotti (2004), Rasul (2006) study
how unilateral versus consensual divorces legislation aﬀect the divorce rate.
The main diﬀerence of our with this approach is that we are not interested in
the eﬀects on the divorce rate, but rather in ﬁn d i n gc a s e sw h e r en o ts i g n i n g
a prenuptial agreement is rational. Our analysis has implications for diﬀer-
ent policy issues. Namely, it allows provisianal answers to the two following
questions: 1) should prenuptial agreements be enforceable and 2) should they
be mandatory (Becker, 1998)? In our model we prove that prenuptial en-
forceability can save relevant litigation costs. When individuals may attach
very diﬀerent values to marriage, there are cases in which all agents prefer
a separating equilibrium in which only partners who attach less value to the
marriage sign prenuptial agreements, to a pooling equilibrium in which all di-
vorcing couples separate in front of a court, since prenuptial agreements are
not enforceable. This result seems to us robust, even if one could prove that
enforceable premarital agreements increase the probability of divorce, and
this increase is socially ineﬃcient (questa frase non so se metterla). Manda-
tory prenuptial agreements, at the opposite, would force agents who evaluate
more the beneﬁt of marriage to separate from the others by signing prenup-
tial agreements which would make separation costly (for instance by using
private arbitrators). Thus, mandatory agreements in our model would be at
best irrelevant.
Considering more in details each single contribution, Fella et al. is the
paper more theoretically oriented and for this reason more closely connected
with ours. Fella et al. study the possibile eﬀects of diﬀerent divorce laws
on the divorce rate. In this endevour they model with particular attention
all those aspects of marriage which are not veriﬁable by a court. We are
interested in analyzing the role of prenuptial agreements as a way to avoid
the use of courts. In our setup it is therefore natural to model primarily the
complementary aspects of marital life, that is, those which are veriﬁable.
The other papers have a similar focus, but a more applied nature. The
closest to our contribution is that by Matouschek and Rasul (2004) in which
the authors analyze the diﬀerent motivations to marry instead of simply co-
habiting. They model marriage as an exclusive relation which increases the
cost of separation with respect to cohabiting. Their main (empirical) result is
that marriage has an incentive eﬀect, rather than a signaling one.
In our paper, we make a similar comparison between marriages with or
without prenuptial agreements, since the former (like cohabitation), induce
lower cost of exiting the relationship. Nevertheless, we focus on the signaling
3eﬀects of the prenuptial agreement rather than the incentive ones. However,
we show that marriage without prenuptial agreement can have incentive ef-
fects with respect to marriage with prenups, which resonably has incentive
eﬀects with respect to cohabiting. Therefore Matouschek and Rasul (2004)
ﬁndings are not inconsistent with ours, even though marriage without prenup-
tial has a signaling eﬀect with respect to marriage with it. A more precise
assessment of the issue could be done in a model where agents can choose
among cohabiting, marriage without prenuptial agreement and marriage with
prenup, which is not available as yet.
The second stream of literature takes into consideration the strategic
contents of the contracting activity. Non-contingent contracts as a signaling/
screening device are analyzed in Aghion-Bolton (1987), Diamond (1993) Her-
malin (2001), Bordignon and Brusco (2001), and especially Spier’s (1992).
Incomplete contracts may help in establishing the appropriate incentive in
presence of imperfect veriﬁability (Bernheim and Whinston (1998)). The
last two contributions are concerned with the endogenization of incomplete
contracts and in this respect they are closely related with ours.
Even though our paper does not deal with incomplete contract theory, we
think that it can provide two side contributions to that literature. In order
to explain these contributions, recall that, loosely speaking, there are two
kinds of incomplete contracts: ﬂat contracts, i.e., those specifying the same
action in diﬀerent contingencies, and those not specifying what to do in some
contingency. Our model suggests that the two forms of incompleteness might
have diﬀerent explanations. Current literature neglects this point, because it
tries to derive both forms of contract incompleteness by cost of complexity.
The second contribution to the general theory of incomplete contract is that
literal incompleteness might matter. Also this point is neglected because it
is often assumed that literal incompleteness has no eﬀect when renegotiation
is allowed.3
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the bench mark
model and we present how courts rule on divorce when agents have not drawn
up divorce clauses in their marriage contracts. In Section 3 we state our
main result and in the following Section 4 generalizes this result discussing
the optimal separating contract. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e A g e n t s ’ M o d e l
Population is constituted by many agents, N, who live two periods and in
period 0 have a private endowment equal to 1. Each agent i can use the
3See Hermalin and Katz (1993).
4private endowment as an input factor, denoted by e, to produce a durable,
public (within the couple) good G. We assume that for production purposes
the public good is “indivisible”, that is, either it is produced or it is not. In
the consumption activity we assume that G ∈ [0,1], i.e., the good is perfectly
divisible. This assumption captures the idea that in real world spouses may
have children or not, but they can enjoy their company for fractions of time.
Moreover, couples can buy a house, but courts can impose to sell it and share
the proceeds. This assumption allows to avoid dealing with these ﬁne details
of divorce decision which we do not feel as relevant for this paper.
Agent i can enjoy the endowment as leisure, denoted by l,i n s t e a do f
devoting the time for the production of the public good. Hence: ei+li ≤ 1 for
each agent i ∈ N,t h a ti s ,e ﬀort and leisure cannot exceed total endowment.
For simplicity, let assume that ei,l i ∈ {0,1}. We refer to the activities li
and ei respectively as agent i’s leisure and eﬀort, but we may think at
them as money, time, etc., spent respectively for private consumption or
for the production of the durable public good. Production of the public
good G is a risky activity which depends on the eﬀort devoted by agent i.
When agents i and j are married, we will denote the probability that the
public good is produced as: Pr{G =1 ;ei,e j} = ρ(ei,e j). We will build a
symmetric model and therefore ρ(1,0) = ρ(0,1). This allows to simplify
notation and deﬁne: ρ2 = ρ(1,1), ρ1 = ρ(1,0) = ρ(0,1) and ρ0 = ρ(0,0),
which denote respectively the probability that the durable good is produced
when both spouses exert eﬀort, only one does and nobody does. We assume
that: ρ2 >ρ 1 >ρ 0 > 0, that is, leisure contribute less to the production
activity of the public good than eﬀort. There are two types of agents, who
diﬀer for the value that they assign to the public good G:l e t vh denote
the value assigned by the high type agents to the public good and vl the
value assigned by the low-types with vh >v l ≥ 0. For instance, partners
can spend their time either in activities which beneﬁt more who performs
them (think for instance to a professional occupation whose beneﬁts are not
only monetary but also intangible and can be measured in terms of status,
personal fulﬁlment, social recognition, etc.), or in activities like home care,
children education, etc. which have a (more) symmetric eﬀect on the welfare
of the partners and can be considered public goods within the couple. People
diﬀer on the value they assign to children education or to home life, but still
all individuals usually prefer to have well educated children or a cosy house.
Agents are matched in pairs; θ i st h ed e g r e eo fﬁt of the partners and
we assume that it is a random variable with θ ∈ {θb,θ g},w i t hθb < −vh,
θg > 0,E(θ) ≥ 0. The assumption that θb ≤− vh implies that the psy-
chological aspects of marriages, summarized by the degree of ﬁt, are more
relevant than the productive ones. More to the point, the psychological as-
5pects can drive couples to divorce even when successful from a productive
point of view. We deserve this as a reasonable assumption for relationships
like marriages, and even more so since we are not interested in studying the
eﬀects of prenuptial agreement laws on the divorce rate.L e tp =P r{θ = θb}.
Agents (and couples) live two periods. A married couple can divorce only in
the second period. We assume that the degree of ﬁt, θ, and the production
of the durable good, G, are uncorrelated. Agents’ expected utility function
is linear and separable in all components with no discounting. Given our
assumptions, all agents prefer to be matched with a partner who provides
eﬀort rather than with one who chooses leisure. If type k = {h,l} agent
decides to marry, her ex-post utility function is:
ui = θ + vk + li + ξ [θ + vk]
+(1− ξ)[αivk − Φi]
where ξ is an indicator functions such that ξ =1if agent i has a partner
at time t =1and ξ =0otherwise; αi is the portion of good G that agent
i receives according to the divorce rule and Φi is the sum of the litigation
costs and monetary transfers (eventually negative) from i to j.
The information structure of the game is as follows. The agents cannot
observe the degree of ﬁt θ until they marry. This assumption is obviously
restrictive, and could literally be justiﬁed if agents cannot live together before
marriage. Here, the assumption can also capture the fact that agents can
change in that critical part of life just after marriage. During the relations,
agents can observe the amount eventually produced but not the level of eﬀort.
Courts can verify both the amount of public good produced and the level of
eﬀort, but going to a court costs F to each partner, where F is the cost, not
necessarily monetary, of a divorce suit in front of a court.
The timing of the game is the following. In the ﬁrst stage nature selects
high types with probability q and low ones with complementary probability.
Then each agent proposes a contract. Writing (and reading) a contract costs
ε,w h e r eε is a ﬁxed and arbitrarily small amount. Then a matching phase
starts. Agents are drawn in pairs from a ballot box containing the entire
population. If both agents propose the same contract, then the contract is
signed (and no contract is signed whenever both agents do not want to sign
any ex-ante contract). If agents propose diﬀerent contracts, they are put
again in the ballot. Pairs are sequentially drawn. Matching is in logic time
and ends when all the remaining agents were already matched with all the
others left in the ballot. For sake of simplicity, we assume that the number
of agents of each type, |k|,w i t hk = {h,l} is even.
After matching, marriage begins and each agent decides whether to de-
vote eﬀort in producing the durable (public within the couple) good or to
6enjoy leisure. Nature determines the degree of ﬁto ft h em a r r i e dp a r t n e r s ,
who afterwards observe the outcome and the level of production. Spouses si-
multaneously decide whether to continue the marriage or to end it. Divorce
occurs if at least one of the partners wishes to end the marriage. In case
of divorce spouses may negotiate an ex-post agreement. We simply assume
that Nature draws up one of the two partners who is entitled to propose an
ex-post agreement, while the other can accept or refuse it. Proposing (and
accepting) an ex-post agreement has the same cost as an ex-ante agreement,
ε. If the proposal is accepted the ex-post agreement is enforced. On the
contrary, if the proposal is rejected, spouses go to court.
The Set of Contracts The contract must be ﬂat, if agents are not willing
to pay the veriﬁcation costs, 2F.I nt h eo p p o s i t e ,am a r i t a lc o n t r a c ts p e c i ﬁes
all transactions between partners in case of divorce: to whom the public good
G is assigned and the amount of monetary transfer from one spouse to the
other. Hence, if partners verify the levels of eﬀort, the contract is a function
f : {0,1}×{ 0,1} → [0,1] × (−∞,∞)
where the domain is the level of eﬀort provided by agent 1 and 2 respectively,
and the range is the amount of the public good eventually produced assigned
to agent 1, and a monetary transfer (that can be negative) from agent 2 to
agent 1. We consider here deterministic premarital contracts, that is contracts
where either the eﬀort is always veriﬁed or never. In Section 4 we consider
a larger set of premarital contracts which allows for random veriﬁcation.
Finally, we assume that both ex-ante and ex-post marriage contracts are
enforceable.
The Court’s Rules Divorce rules adopted by courts vary among diﬀerent
countries and States. There are basically two regimes: (i) a “community
property” regime, which essentially means that marital property belongs
equally to the partners and in case of (no-fault) divorce it is equally shared;
(ii) an “equitable division” regime according to which the “division of jointly
owned marital property and the amount of any monetary transfer between
the partners is determined by a court in order to reach “a fair and equitable
solution”.4 In this second case the marital property is not always divided
equally, and many factors, such as the contribution of each party to the
well-being of the family and to the acquisition of the marital property, the
4The Code of Virginia § 20-107.3. In US a community property regime is adopted, for
instance in Arizona, California, and Texas, but the majority of States provide for equitable
rather than equal distribution.
7circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of the mar-
riage, the personal characteristics (age, mental condition) of each partner,
etc., are usually taken into account by the court. In our model agents may
diﬀer for their type and the eﬀort they exerted, but the courts may only ob-
serve this second characteristic and then equitable divorce rules should only
depend upon the levels of eﬀort. We restrict a divorce rule to select an equal
division of the property (without any monetary transfer) in all cases where
parties behaved identically, either exerting eﬀort or not exerting it. In case,
the parties exerted a diﬀerent level of eﬀort and an agent used his/her own
endowment for personal well-being, we require that court adopts the rule
which (i) awards the other party with a monetary compensation in order to
oﬀset the agent who has exerted eﬀort for the well-being of the couple; (ii)
assigns the marital asset to the agent who exerted more eﬀort. Our model
is consistent with the equitable division regime.5 Since the court replaces
decisions which parties could autonomously take, we will denote the court
decision with the same function f (·) as the prenuptial contract, with some
abuse of notation. Hence,






f (1,0) = (1,m)
f (0,1) = (0,−m)
In this paper we assume that 1 ≥ m>2F,w h e r et h eﬁrst inequality says
that the maximal penalty provided for by law is not greater then the initial
endowment. The last inequality implies that partners will always prefer to
d i v o r c ei nc a s eo fb a dm a t c he v e ni ft h e yh a v et og ot oac o u r t .m>2F states
that the total litigation cost (psychological included) should not exceed the
possible gains of litigation. We think that these are realistic assumptions in
most cases.
2.1 The Flat Premarital Contract
Since the veriﬁcation activity is costly, going to court implies a loss of eﬃ-
ciency. In our model spouses can avoid the cost of litigation by signing a
premarital contract such that f is a constant function and therefore there is
no need to verify the level of individual eﬀorts. The ﬂat contract is a func-
tion f(ei,e j)=( β,0) where β ∈ [0,1], for all ei,e j ∈ {0,1}. Clearly, if this
5Our model would be consistent also with the community property regime, if the lack
of eﬀort could be considered suﬃcient for a fault-divorce. However, in our model the lack
of eﬀort is never the cause of the divorce which can therefore be considered a no-fault one.
8contract is signed and is enforceable, then there is no reason to go to a court
in case of divorce. In all cases the public good eventually produced will be
split between the partners according to the contract and no monetary com-
pensation is due to the partner by the shirking agent. In the next subsection
we will deal with the fair ﬂat premarital contract where the good is splitted
evenly, that is, where β = 1
2.
2.2 Preliminary Results when Types are Observable
In this paper we want to show that the absence of a premarital contract is
a credible signalling device. Therefore, we focus on the case in which, this is
the only reason not to sign such a contract.
Suppose that types were observable. Moreover assume that high ones
would like to separate and when separated both (the high and the low) make
the eﬃcient choice of eﬀort when they sign a ﬂat premarital contract. Finally,
suppose that the low type does not provide eﬀort in equilibrium, while the
high does (and these choices are consistent with eﬃciency). Under these
assumptions, partners choose not to sign a premarital contract, only due to
signalling problems, whenever types are not observable.
Analytically, it is eﬃcient to shirk for the low-type if:











(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ0)
. (1)
It is eﬃcient to exert eﬀort for high-type if:
vh ≥
2
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ0)
. (2)
Moreover, suppose that in case of divorce the public good is equally split
between the parties. A high-type prefers to exert eﬀort in the production
even if the partner does not, if the following holds:










(3 + p)(ρ1 − ρ0)
(3)
Condition (3) implies condition (2) and therefore it is also suﬃcient to ensure
that a high-type prefers to exert eﬀort in the production when also the part-
ner does. The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If couples are formed by agents of the same type, and condi-
tions (1) and (3) hold, then the ﬂat premarital contract f(ei,e j)=( 1
2,0) for
all ei,e j ∈ {0,1} is eﬃcient and incentive compatible.
If agents are able to observe partner’s type, then each high-type agent
chooses a high-type partner and both exert eﬀort and achieves full separation.
When agents do not observe partner’s type and eﬀort the ﬂat premarital
contract does not induce the separation of types. In fact, a low-type prefers
to marry a high-type and still to put no eﬀort in the production of the public
good, since all agents prefer to be married with one who provides eﬀort, than
the opposite.
The previous result suggests that in homogeneous groups or societies
which share the same religious values or cultural traditions, we expect to
observe the community property regime as a durable and widespread in-
stitution. In fact, the community of cultural or religious values typically
increases the information on the potential partner’s type. In more hetero-
geneous societies in which screening and signalling problems between the
potential partners may emerge, we expect to observe a variety of diﬀerent
marital institutions and contracts.
3M a i n R e s u l t s
In this section we prove that there exists a Bayesian perfect separating equi-
librium where all partnerships are formed by agents of the same type, pro-
vided that some conditions are satisﬁed. In this section we focus on the case
where a spouse can only propose to her counterpart to sign a premarital
contract in the set Φ or to not sign any premarital contract. As mentioned
above, in the next Section we consider more sophisticated premarital con-
tracts where the probability of eﬀort veriﬁcation is not always either zero or
one.
High-type agents propose to the selected partner to sign “no contract”,
low-type agents propose to sign the ﬂat contract of proposition 1. Hence, in
equilibrium the adverse selection problem is solved and all agents exert their
10eﬃcient level of eﬀort. Moreover, high-type agents choose to go to Court
and not to sign a post marital contract just before divorcing. Ineﬃcient
litigation is the result of a signaling game. Players who receive a proposal
for an ex-post agreement assign probability 1 that the proposer of an ex-post
agreement is an agent who exerted zero eﬀo r t .G i v e nt h i sb e l i e fi ti so p t i m a l
for the receiver to refuse the renegotiation proposal, because the court will
force the partner to compensate for the misconduct. Therefore nobody will
ever propose a post nuptial agreement. Here we will summarize the main
proposition, while leaving a more precise statement and the proof in the
Appendix.
Proposition 2 If the parameters satisfy (1) and (3) if:
vh ≥ 2
1+F (1 − p)
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ0)
vl ≤ min
½
1 − (1 − p)m
1
2ρ2(3 + p) − ρ1(1 + p)
,
2(1− p)(m + F)
2(1+p)ρ1 − (3 + p)ρ0
¾
,
then there exists a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that:




3) high-type agents do not propose any contract;
4) low-type agents sign a ﬂat premarital contract and therefore never incur
in litigation costs;
5) all couples divorce when θ = θb (the degree of ﬁti sn e g a t i v e ) ;
7) high-type partners always face costly litigation in case of divorce;
8) Agents who receive an ex-post agreement proposal will believe with probabil-
ity one that the partner shirked; therefore, nobody in equilibrium will propose
an ex-post agreement.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The separating equilibrium does exist since for high-type agents the gain
of joining with a high-productivity partner is greater then the expected cost
of facing a contentious divorce, while the opposite holds true for low-type
agents. This occurs since agents diﬀer in their private evaluation over the
public good: low-type agents assign a low value to the public good and there-
fore the expected cost due to the positive probability of a contentious divorce
does not compensate the increase in the ex-ante probability of producing the
public good when the partner is a high type. The assumption that m>2F
implies that no agent who exerted eﬀort wants to make an ex-post agreement
proposal. In fact the only proposals that are going to be accepted provide a
11payoﬀ of −m to the proposer, which is always lower than the payoﬀ she can
obtain by going to the court.
The choice to not sign any contract is an eﬀective device to sustain the
separating equilibrium, because partners who have to go in front of a court
decide to not complete their contracts, even if to go to a court is ex-post
not eﬃcient. This decision is sustained by speciﬁc out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
That is, if a partner receives an ex-post negotiation proposal, he assigns prob-
ability one that the proposer shirked. This belief implies that a renegotiation
proposal is refused. This, in turn, implies that in equilibrium a proposal is
never made. The next goal of this section is to show that this belief is the
only one satisfying the weakest of the divinity criteria: the D1 criterion.
We will not deﬁne the D1 criterion formally. Its intuition is as follows.
Suppose that one player is observed deviating from the equilibrium and that
there are two diﬀerent types of that player, types 1 and 0.M o r e o v e r ,s u p p o s e
that any belief that the deviating player might held, induces 0 to deviate
whenever it induces 1 to do so, but not the opposite. That is, there are
beliefs that induce 0 to deviate, but not 1. Then, according to D1, we must
assign probability zero that the deviating player is of type 1.
Proposition 3 For any positive, arbitrarily small, cost of proposing an ex-
post agreement, ε,i fm>0, then only the equilibrium beliefs of Proposition 2
satisfy the D1 criterion, that is, the counterpart who receives a renegotiation
proposal infers that the proposer shirked with probability 1.
Proof. See the Appendix
The intuition of this proposition is the following. Agents who have not
exerted eﬀort are more prone to renegotiate since in case of litigation in front
of a court they incur in the penalty that the court inﬂicts to shirking agent.
For this reason an agent infers that the partner shirked in case she receives
an agreement proposal.
Remark 1 We assumed that both agents simultaneously choose to divorce, if
θ = θb, before negotiating the divorce. Our argument still holds if we assumed
that the proposer may also propose to continue the marriage. In this case, the
equilibrium beliefs should assign probability 1 that the partner who proposes
t oc o n t i n u et h em a r r i a g ei sas h i r k e r .
Remark 2 Notice that a proposal of an ex post agreement could be done both
by a deviating high-type who did not exert eﬀort, or by a deviating low type
who ﬁnd it optimal to shirk if married with an high type. Given assumption
(3) the former case is excluded. However in the Appendix we prove that the
12equilibrium holds also for parameter values which do not satisfy (1) and (3).
Under those more general conditions it is possible to conceive a deviating high
type for whom shirking is not a dominated strategy.
Remark 3 The main implication of previous Remark 2 is that the absence
of a contract can also have incentive eﬀects on partners, inducing them to
behave correctly, besides having important sorting ones.
4 The Optimal Separating Contract
As we pointed out above, going to court is a (credible) device to sustain a
separating equilibrium, but it is ex post ineﬃcient. Therefore, a contract
inducing partners to litigate with probability one in case of divorce may not
be an optimal separating contract. In fact, high-type partners might achieve
separation going to court with some positive probability (less than one) in
case of divorce. This strategy allows to reduce the ex-post ineﬃciency by
reducing the probability of a divorce suit.
In this section we want to study the best contract (in term of high-type
agents payoﬀ) which sustains a separating equilibrium. To this aim, we
consider here a larger set of premarital contracts, where they specify not only
to whom the public good eventually produced is assigned and a monetary
transfer between partners, but also the probability to go a court. Let P max
be the maximal feasible penalty for misconduct, that we assume ﬁnite either
for the presence of liquidity constraint or because contracts with higher fees
are not enforceable by law. Since a high-type agent never incurs in the
punishment, it is clearly optimal to ﬁx it at its maximum level.
We focus here on the case that the probability of going to court (i.e. to
verify the eﬀort exerted by the partners) does not depend upon the amount
of public good produced. In a previous version we generalize the analysis to
the case when the probability of litigation may change whether the public
good were produced or not. The analysis of the general case is analytically
less simple but not much more informative from an economic point of view.
Let γ be the probability of going to court in case of divorce. Let con-
sider any pair (vh,v l) such that conditions (1) and (3) are satisﬁed. Recall
that the ﬂat contract is eﬃcient and high-type agents do provide eﬀort even
if the partner does not, and therefore the only relevant constraint is the
self-selection one for the low-types. The optimal separating contract is the
contract which sustains the separating equilibrium described in Proposition
2 providing the highest expected utility to the high-type agents. Hence the
optimal separating contract is the contract which minimizes the probability γ
13of ex-post veriﬁcation subject to the self-selection constraint for the low-type
being satisﬁed.
Proposition 4 If the parameters satisfy (1) and (3) then the contract which
provides for eﬀort veriﬁcation with probability
γ
∗ ≡
vl(ρ1 − ρ0)(3 + p)
(1 − p)(ρ1vl +2 ( P + F))
in case of divorce, maximizes the high-type agents’ expected utility, among all
contracts which sustain a separating equilibrium. The above optimal separat-
ing contract is renegotiation-proof: if an agent proposes to renegotiate this
contract, the partner assigns probability 1 to the fact that the proposer has
not exerted eﬀort, by the D1 criterion
Proof. See the Appendix
This analysis deserves some comments. We prove that the optimal sep-
arating contract induces costly litigation with a positive probability. This
result is consistent with the observation that couples who enter in a divorce
process sometimes end their relationship with an adversarial divorce, but
sometimes reach an amicable agreement before entering into a litigation in
front of a court. In our model to sign the optimal prenuptial agreement with
random veriﬁcation is equivalent to not sign any prenuptial agreement and
accept to sign a postnuptial agreement with probability γ∗, in case of divorce.
Note in fact that the same reasons which prevent partners from renegotiat-
ing their contract (as we showed in Remark (??)), prevent them to accept
postnuptial agreement with a probability higher than γ∗.
Finally, the divorce legislation determines which couples do write pre-
marital agreements. If divorce legislation always oblige to equally divide
the marital asset, we expect that high-type couples do write premarital con-
tracts with random veriﬁcation, for instance using private arbitrators, while
low-type couples do not write any premarital contract, because the regime
replicates their equilibrium contract described in section 3.
4.1 Robustness of the Equilibrium to the Matching
Process
In our model we restrict the agent to announce a single contract in the
matching stage. Hence a problem of multiple equilibria immediately arises.
Any contract which provides to agents a utility higher than the utility of re-
maining alone, is an equilibrium of the game when all agents announce this
c o n t r a c ts i n c en oa g e n tc a nd e v i a t em a k i n gad i ﬀerent proposal. Hence, in
14order to reﬁne our equilibria we could generalize the matching stage allowing
each agent to propose not only a single contract, but a set of contracts that
he agrees to sign. We take here a diﬀerent approach, which is analogous to
that taken in the matching literature and more speciﬁcally in the network
formation literature. In that literature it is used the concept of pairwise-
stable allocation for cooperative equilibria, ﬁrst introduced by Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) and more recently the notion of pairwise-Nash equilibrium
for non-cooperative equilibria (see Calvó-Armengol and ˙ Ilkiliç (2005)). We
simply extend those notions to our setup of incomplete information. Namely,
a pairwise stable perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium satisfying the D1 crite-
rion is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium such that there exists no pair of
agents that proposing a diﬀerent contract can gain a higher expected utility
under the constraint that their beliefs have to satisfy the D1 criterion.
For instance, by condition (1), low-type agents prefer to not exert eﬀort if
they sign a ﬂat contract. It follows that there is no pairwise perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium where all agents propose the same contract in the match-
i n gs t a g ea n dt h e ne x e r te ﬀort during the relationship. Suppose in fact that
(i) there exists a contract where ex-post veriﬁcation occurs with some posi-
tive probability such that the expected punishment for shirking agents is so
l a r g et oi n d u c el o w - t y p ea g e n t st oe x e r te ﬀort; (ii) all agents propose such a
contract in the matching stage. Consider then any pair of low-type agents:
they can sign a ﬂat contract, do not exert eﬀort, and obtain a strictly larger
payoﬀ.
Proposition 5 Consider any pair (vh,v l) which satisﬁes conditions 1 and








, then the unique pairwise stable perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is the separating equilibrium where low-type cou-
ples sign a ﬂat contract and high-type couples sign the contract that in case
of divorce provide for eﬀort veriﬁcation with random probability γ∗.
Proof. See the Appendix.
5 Discussion and Interpretation
Our paper oﬀers an explanation for the scarce diﬀusion of the prenuptial
agreements, based not on the presence of large transaction costs, bounded
rationality or psychological qualms, but on rational behavior in a match-
ing market characterized by asymmetric information on the partners’ types.
Namely, we show that under some conditions agents can rationally choose
to not draw up these contracts. Moreover we prove that the enforceability
15of prenuptial agreement can also be eﬃcient, since prenuptial agreements al-
low to save litigation costs for those couples which attach less value to this
institution. It is important to stress that we do not show that under any
condition is eﬃcient that agents can (but not have to) draw such contracts.
Nevertheless we believe that to defend the principle of freedom contracting
(and of no mandatory contracting) is suﬃcient to prove that there are at
least some conditions under which this freedom is consistent with a rational
and eﬃcient behavior.
In the following lines we discuss some assumptions of our model.
Matching. We restricted ourselves to matching rules which prevent agents
from remaining unmatched. In fact, we were interested in analyzing how part-
ners contract over their divorce and how diﬀerent contracts aﬀect the ex-post
probability of divorce, while we were not concerned about how the divorcing
decision aﬀects the ex-ante probability to marry. However, we conjecture
that generalizing the model would not change the qualitative results.
Renegotiation. In the model agents may complete their contracts after
having observed the outcome, and therefore when they already exerted the
eﬀort. High-type agents reject any proposal in the renegotiation stage since
they believe that the partner who makes a proposal did not exert eﬀort.
What does it happen if we allow agents to complete the contract at time
0, before eﬀort is exerted? Let us consider a game where at time zero an
agent can ask to complete the contract to the partner, but, consistently
with this assumption, the partner may accept or reject the proposal. If she
rejects, she can then decide whether to continue the marriage or to divorce
in order to marry with a diﬀerent partner. It is possible to check that our
main argument still holds. There exists a separating equilibrium where high-
type agents reject the proposal to complete the contract since they believe
with probability one that the partner who makes the proposal is a low-type
who is going to not exert eﬀort. Moreover, (after rejection) they divorce in
order to ﬁnd a new partner. One can also check that these beliefs are the
only one satisfying the D1 criterion. In fact, a deviating low-type prefers to
not exert eﬀort. Therefore he is more prone to renegotiate the incomplete
contract which is costly in case of divorce at time one after the eﬀort has
been exerted.
T h eR o l eo ft h eC o u r t .We assume that courts may verify how a spouse
uses her initial endowment (eﬀort) (even if the partner cannot) at the same
cost at which the partner observes it. This seems to us a reasonable assump-
tion, since courts (even if have not direct information) have coercive and
mandatory power and they can inspect bank accounts, call a third party as
a witness, etc.. Moreover by letting the law (and consequently the courts)
determine which is a misconduct and which is a proof of such a behavior,
16partners (who, in general are not lawyers) implicitly increase the cost of ob-
serving a violation of the (incomplete) contract and decrease the cost for a
third party to verify it.
On the contrary, we do not assume that courts may verify the production
technology, that is a “black box” for courts, which can only observe the indi-
vidual inputs and the total output. In this model, we speak about courts, but
agents can also use private arbitrators, and our arguments still hold. How-
ever, there might be other reasons to prefer courts to private arbitrators. For
instance, the veriﬁcation technology (which in our setting determines the lit-
igations costs) may present increasing return to scale, so that a centralized
institution (a court) is more eﬃcient than private arbitrators6;a n o t h e rj u s t i -
ﬁcation is that private arbitrators may be more prone to collusive agreements
with one of the party than a court. Such consideration is even more relevant
if we introduce some form of asymmetry between the parties, which seems
an important issue, since it is reasonable to assume that a court protects the
weakest party more eﬃciently than a private arbitrator.
6It worths noticing that in our framework courts have to be eﬃcient, as far as it regards
the cost of veriﬁcation, but not too much. In fact if courts are “too eﬃcient” and are able
to verify agents’ eﬀort without no costs, high-type agents will prefer to draw up contracts
which provide for private costly arbitration, in order to maintain positive costs of divorce.
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196 Appendix
In order to prove Proposition 2, we ﬁrst prove that our equilibrium holds also
for a more general set of parameter values and then prove that the proposition
is an implication of the more general one.





1 − m(1 − p)
(1 − p)ρ2 +2( 1+p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
,
2(1− p)F
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
,
1+( 1− p)F








(3 + p)(ρ1 − ρ0)
,
(1 − p)(m + F)
2(1+p)ρ1 − (3 + p)ρ0
,
(1 − p)F +1
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ0)
¾
then the following perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists:
High-type agents:
1) announce to sign no contract. They reject any contract proposal;
2) exert the eﬃcient level of eﬀort: ei =1 ;




4) choose to divorce if θ = θb;
5) in case of divorce and the partner is the proposer of the ex-post agreement:
5.1)i ft h e ye x e r t e de ﬀort they accept only proposals such that they receive the
public good eventually produced and monetary transfer from the partner at
least equal to m − F.
5.2) if they shirked they accept any proposal such that they pay at most m+F
to the partner and do not receive any amount of the public good eventually
produced;
6) in case of divorce and if they are the proposers of the ex-post agreement:
6.1)i ft h e ye x e r t e de ﬀort they do not make any proposal;
6.2) if they shirked they oﬀer to give to the partner the public good and to
pay a total transfer of m − F to her.
Low-type agents:
1) announce to sign the ﬂat contract, f(ei,e j)=( 1
2,0) for all ei,e j ∈ {0,1}.
They reject any proposal to sign a prenuptial agreement with eﬀort veriﬁca-
tion;
2) do not exert any eﬀort in the equilibrium path, ei =0 ;
3) shirk if married with an high type;
4) behave as high type agents (who exert the same level of eﬀort) both in the
20decision about divorcing and in the renegotiation stage, whenever no complete
contract was drawn.
If an agent proposes a premarital contract, the partner assumes with probabil-
ity 1 that the proposer is a low-type. In case of divorce, if partner j proposes
an ex-post agreement, then agent i has beliefs which assign probability 1 that
agent j exerted zero eﬀort.
Proof. High-type agents. The high types prefer to exert eﬀort than
not exerting it, when they marry a high-type partner and do not sign any
premarital contract if:




E (θ)+1+ρ1vh + p(θg + ρ1vh) − (1 − p)(m + F)
that is
vh ≥
1 − m(1 − p)
1
2 (1 − p)ρ2 +( 1+p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
. (4)
If the high type who marries a low one will exert eﬀort, the self-selection
constraint for the high type is satisﬁed if:




E (θ)+ρ1vh + p(θg + ρ1vh)+( 1− p)ρ1
vh
2
which is equivalent to:
vh ≥
2(1− p)F
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
. (5)
If the high type who marries a low one will shirk, the self-selection constraint
for the high type is satisﬁed if:









1+F (1 − p)
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ0)
(6)
It is obvious that either (5) or (6) is binding. If (5) is binding then the
deviating high type will exert eﬀort when married to a low one. Otherwise,
he will shirk. (5) will be binding if:
2(1− p)F
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
≥ 2
1+F (1 − p)




(1 − p)(ρ1 − ρ0)
Low-type agents. A low type agent who marries a low-type partner and
signs a ﬂat premarital contract, prefers to shirk (conditioned to the fact the
partner does not exert eﬀort) if:




E (θ)+ρ1vl + p(θg + ρ1vl)+( 1− p)ρ1
vl
2
which after easy calculation becomes:
vl ≤
2
(3 + p)(ρ1 − ρ0)
(7)
A deviating low type who marries a high type, prefers to not exert eﬀort if
E (θ)+1+ρ1vl + p(θg + ρ1vl) − (1 − p)(m + F) ≥









1 − (1 − p)m
1
2ρ2(3 + p) − ρ1(1 + p)
, (8)
and it is easy to check that both numerator and denominator of the right
side are positive for p<1. When a deviating low type shirks if married to
an high one, the self selection constraint for the low type is satisﬁed if:




E (θ)+1+ρ1vl + p(θg + ρ1vl) − (1 − p)(m + F)
that is
vl ≤
2(1− p)(m + F)
2(1+p)ρ1 − (3 + p)ρ0
(9)
provided that the denominator is positive, otherwise it is always satisﬁed.
Finally, the unique ex-post proposal that is going to be accepted is such that
the proposer pays m − F to her partner and leaves her the property of the
public good. In not making any proposal a high-type agent who exerted
eﬀort obtains −F, in case no public good has been produced and
vh
2 − F in
case it has been produced. It follows that no proposal is going to be made
22by a high-type (who exerted eﬀort) if −m + F<−F or m>2F, as we
assumed. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Notice that (3) implies (4).I nf a c t :
2
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
−
1 − m(1 − p)
1
2 (1 − p)ρ2 +( 1+p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
=
2
(3 − 2p − p2)(ρ2 − ρ1)m +( 1− p)ρ1
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)((3 + p)ρ2 − 2(1+p)ρ1)
≥ 0
Moreover, (3) implies (5).I nf a c t :
2
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
≥
2(1− p)F
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
iﬀ: 1 ≥ (1 − p)F,w h i c hi ss a t i s ﬁed by assumption. Therefore only (6)
imposes new restrictions on the set of parameter values where the model
holds with respect to (3).
Finally notice that (1) implies (7),b u tn o t(8) and (9). ¥
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider agent i who values vi = {vh,v l} the
public good and who does provide eﬀort in the public good production, ei =
1. Let (γvi,χ) be an ex-post agreement where γ ∈ [0,1] is the portion of
good G to be assigned to agent i and χ is a monetary transfer from i to her
partner (which can be negative). Denoted with µ1 the probability that the
partner will accept the proposal, agent i will propose the ex post agreement
(γvi,χ) if the following holds:











where λ =1if the public good has been produced, λ =0otherwise. Notice
that the inequality can be satisﬁed only if:
λγvi − χ − λ
vi
2
+ F ≥ ε
Therefore the inequality can be expressed as:
µ1 ≥
ε





Agent i who does not provide eﬀort in the public good production, ei =0 ,
will propose an ex-post agreement, denoted with µ0 the probability that the
partner will accept the proposal, if
µ0 (λγvi − χ)+( 1− µ0)(−m − F) − ε ≥− m − F
23Again notice that the inequality is satisﬁed only if:




λγvi − χ + m + F
≡ µ
0
Noticing that m>0, it is easy to check that µ
0 <µ
1 for any value of ε>0.
Hence there exists a larger set of conjectures that i might hold that induces
i to deviate when ei =0with respect to when ei =1 . Hence for the D1
criterion the partner should assign probability 1 to the fact that ei =0 . ¥
Proof of Remark 2. Suppose that a postnuptial agreement is always signed
in case of divorce. A high-type agent prefers to shirk than to exert eﬀort if
E (θ)+ρ2vh + p(θg + ρ2vh)+( 1− p)Uc ≤
E (θ)+1+ρ1vh + p(θg + ρ1vh)+( 1− p)Uc
where Uc is the expected utility gained in case of divorce if the proposal of
an agreement is accepted. The above condition is equivalent to:
vh ≤
1
(1 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
(10)
Hence if condition 10 holds, to shirk is not a dominated strategy. Com-
paring the above condition with those of Proposition 6, we must prove that:
¯ vh ≤ vh ≤
1
(1 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
whose necessary condition is
¯ vh ≤
1





1 − m(1 − p)
(1 − p)ρ2 +2( 1+p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
,
2(1− p)F
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
,2
1+F (1 − p)




(1 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
24We will prove that the inequality holds for each member. Let us start with
the ﬁrst one which would be satisﬁed if:
2
1 − m(1 − p)
(1 − p)ρ2 +2( 1+p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
≤
2
(1 − p)ρ2 +2( 1+p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
≤
1
(1 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
However the ﬁrst inequality is trivially true, while the last inequality is sat-
isﬁed since:
1
(1 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
−
2
((1 − p)ρ2 +2( 1+p)(ρ2 − ρ1))
=
ρ2 (1 − p)
(1 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)((1 − p)ρ2 +2( 1+p)(ρ2 − ρ1))
≥ 0
As for the second element notice that it would be implied by:
2(1− p)F
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
≤
(1 − p)
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
≤
1
(1 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
The ﬁrst inequality is satisﬁed and the last inequality is equivalent to:
1
(1 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
−
(1 − p)
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
=
2+p + p2
(3 + p)(1+p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
≥ 0
which is satisﬁed. For the last we apply a similar argument. It is satisﬁed if:
2
1+F (1 − p)
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ0)
≤ 2
1+( 1− p) 1
2
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ0)
=
2+( 1− p)
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ0)
≤
1
(1 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
25where the ﬁrst inequality is satisﬁed, the equality is simple manipulation,
while the last holds since:
1
(1 + p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
−
2+( 1− p)
(3 + p)(ρ2 − ρ0)
=
3(2ρ2 + ρ1 − 3ρ0)+p(ρ2 +2 ρ1 − 3ρ0)+p2 (ρ2 − ρ1)
(3 + p)(1+p)(ρ2 − ρ0)(ρ2 − ρ1)
≥ 0
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :In order to write the self selection constraint for
t h el o w - t y p ew eh a v et oc o n s i d e ri fal o w - t y p ew h od e v i a t e sa n dm a r r ya
high-type partner exerts eﬀort or not.
T h el o w - t y p ee x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ given a ﬂat contract is




if he deviates, marry a high-type and does exert eﬀort, then his expected
payoﬀ is:







while if he deviates, marry a high-type and does not exert eﬀort his expected
payoﬀ is





By condition (1), (11)≥(12) for all γ ≥ 0. Moreover, (13)>(12) for γ =0 ,
and (13) is monotonically decreasing in γ. It follows that if it exists a γ ∈
[0,1] for which ((11)) = (13)(> (12)),then it is unique and characterizes the
optimal separating contract, being the minimal γ for which the self-selection
constraint is satisﬁed.
Summing up, the probability γ∗ which characterizes the optimal separat-
ing contract is obtained by the following condition




E (θ)+1+ρ1vl + p(θg + ρ1vl)+( 1− p)(−γ
∗(P








vl(ρ1 − ρ0)(3 + p)




∂vl > 0 and that γ∗ =0for vl =0 ,we can calculate the minimal
cost of litigation for a shirking agent, (Pmax + F), which guarantees the exis-
tence of a separating equilibrium for all pair (vl,v h) which satisﬁes conditions












max + F) ≥
2ρ1(1 + p) − ρ0 (3 + p)
(1 − p)(3+p)(ρ2 − ρ0)
.
We still have to check whether the optimal separating contract is renegotia-
tion proof. Namely, we have to check that if an agent proposes to renegotiate
this contract, the partner assigns probability 1 to the fact that the proposer
has not exerted eﬀort, by the D1 criterion. Let γ<γ ∗ be the probability to
go to court in the renegotiation proposal (we only look at proposals where
the penalty is still the largest possible one, Pmax,s i n c e ,o u ra r g u m e n ti m -
mediately applies to the case in which an agent proposes a lower penalty for
misconduct). Let λ be an indicator function such that λ =1if the public
good has been produced, λ =0otherwise. Agent i will propose an ex-post




























where µ1 is the probability that the partner will accept the proposal and










If instead agent i who does not provide eﬀort in the public good production,
ei =0 ,h ew i l lp r o p o s ea ne x - p o s ta g r e e m e n tw h e n :
µ0(−γ(P





























and it is straightforward to note that µ0 <µ 1. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5:
We have to consider two types of equilibria: (i) “separating” equilib-
ria where high-type agent announce a certain type of contract and low-type
agents announce a diﬀerent contract, and therefore all couples are formed by
the same type of agents; (ii) “pooling” equilibria where all agents announce
the same contract (but then diﬀerent types can exert diﬀerent level of eﬀort).
It turns out immediately that the unique potentially pairwise-stable equilib-
rium among the former type is the equilibrium where high-type agents sign a
contract with γ∗ random probability of ex-post veriﬁcation in case of divorce.
In fact if low-type agents sign a diﬀerent contract than the high-type agents,
then they sign a ﬂat contract. Hence, high-type agents sign the signalling
contract which guarantee to them the largest payoﬀ.
Consider now any equilibrium where all agents propose the same contract.
We have already argued in the main text that there is no pairwise stable
equilibrium where low-type agents sign contracts with ex-post veriﬁcation.
Then a “pooling” equilibrium where all agents propose the same contract is
pairwise stable only if low-type agents do not exert eﬀort. It follows that the
contract has no incentive eﬀect, and then the unique proposal that can be
part of a pairwise stable equilibrium is the ﬂat contract. Let ρave = qρ2 +
(1−q)ρ1. A high-type agent obtains a higher payoﬀ in the optimal separating
equilibrium than in the “semi-pooling” equilibrium where all couples sign the
ﬂat contract (and low-type agents do not exert eﬀort) if:
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